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NOTES AND COMMENTS

ney's right to protect himself from defamatory statements, the Court declared that:
Although the individual attorney, in this
respect, is entitled to no greater judicial protection than the law affords to others, he is,
in all justice, certainly entitled to no less

Ramstead case in 1959.

The Court, therefore, has endorsed the
view which favors strict limitation on the
use of absolute privilege. Sassower v. Himwich is thus in direct accord with the Lee
case, but is patently contrary to the result
reached by the Toft case in 1955, and the

The Sassower case represents an apparently logical and prudent approach to the
issue, with a result that appears to protect
the rights of both parties as equally and as
ethically as possible. On the other hand, the
Toft and Ramstead decisions represent a
severe and somewhat inequitable approach,
and result not only in an unjust deprivation
of the attorney's rights, but also cause a
wall of mistrust to arise between the re29
spectable attorney and his client.

28 Sassower v. Himwich, supra note 26.
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protection.
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Recent Decision:
Incontestability Clause Bars
Action by Insured
This policy shall be incontestableafter it
has been in force for a period o two years
from date of issue.
The above is a simple form of "incontestable clause" which appears in most life
insurance policies issued today. Within
limits, the courts agree that the clause bars
the insurance company from asserting many
defenses that would otherwise be available.
The question of whether the clause operates
with equal force on the insured had never
been put in issue until the recent case of
Newton v. New York Life Inc. Co.' The
plaintiff, a holder of several life insurance
and annuity policies, brought the action to
recover damages for alleged fraud, concealment and misrepresentation in the issuance

34 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 328, 329 (1956).

and sale of the policies. All the policies contained clauses providing for incontestability
after either one or two years from date of
issue. In this action, brought more than two
years after the date of issue of the policies,
the district court held that the incontestability clauses are for the benefit of both
the insurer and the insured and consequently
the action is barred.
While the issue in the Newton case is
novel, the incontestable clause itself has
2
been in use for approximately a century,
and oral representations by the insurer to
the effect that the policy shall be incontestable were upheld before that.3 A holder of
a life insurance policy in the early nineteenth century could not know whether his
beneficiary would receive the proceeds of
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY CONTRACT § 5.1
(Krueger & Waggoner ed. 1953).
3 Wood v.Dwarris, 11 Ex. 493, 156 Eng. Rep. 925
2

1 210 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Cal. 1962).

(1856).

9
the policy upon his death or would become
a litigant in a costly action. To overcome
this uncertainty and thus increase sales,
many insurance companies voluntarily began to use some form of incontestable
clause. 4 Shortly thereafter, New York took
the first major legislative step in insurance
reform and required, among other things,
that all life insurance policies issued in New
York contain certain standard provisions
including an incontestable clause.' Today
many states have passed similar legislation
in respect to the use of an incontestable
clause in various insurance contracts.'
It is clear from the legislative pattern
that the incontestable clause is viewed favorably, and this attitude is made even more
evident from the course the courts have
taken. There is general agreement that
fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on
the part of the insured in procuring the
policy cannot be raised by the insurance
company once the period set forth in the
incontestable clause has elapsed.' However, if no period is allowed in which the

insurance company may contest the policy,
some courts have held that fraud is an implied exception, 8 or that the clause is void

4See Massachusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 269, 30 S.E. 918, 922 (1898).
5Laws of New York, 1906, ch. 326, § 101.
'E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10206 (group life policies); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 836(1)c,

838(1)b (Smith-Hurd 1940)

(life policies and

annuity contracts); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175,
§ 132(2) (1959) (life and annuity contracts);
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 155(b), 163(b) (life policies
and industrial life policies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,

§ 510(c) (1954) (life policies).
7Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n of America,
118 N.Y. 237, 23 N.E. 186 (1890); Dibble v.
Reliance Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199, 149 Pac. 171
(1915).
8 Welch v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 108 Iowa
224, 78 N.W. 853 (1899). This issue is seldom
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as against public policy. 9 The contrary view
is that even though no period to contest is
allowed, the company has sufficient time
to investigate before it issues the policy."
Although certain defenses may be specifically exempted by the insurer from operation
of the clause," few states allow this exemp12
tion to the defense of fraud.

Where the insurance company does not
seek to avoid the policy, but merely to reform it according to the tenor of the intended
agreement, it is generally held that reformation is available in spite of the incontestable clause. The action "is not a contest of
the policy, but a prayer to make a written
instrument speak the real agreement of the
parties."1 3 Although there is authority to
the contrary,'14 New York and a majority of

raised because few policies are issued providing
for incontestability from date. 8 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 2155, at 6954 (1931).
9 Reagan v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 189 Mass.
555, 76 N.E. 217 (1905).
10 Duvall v. National Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 356, 154
Pac. 632 (1916); Patterson v. Natural Premium
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N.W. 980
(1898).
"VANCE, INSURANCE § 97, at 583 (3d ed. 1951);
3 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 410, at 1357 (5th ed.
1952).
12 American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 111 Tex. 155,
230 S.W. 397 (1921); VANCE, op. cit. supra note
II. As to the exception of disability and double

indemnity provisions from the operation of the
incontestable clause, see Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of the United States v. Kushman, 276 N.Y. 178,
II N.E.2d 719 (1937); Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
v. Schwartz, 274 N.Y. 374, 9 N.E.2d 16 (1937);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rotman, 231 Iowa
1249, 3 N.W.2d 603 (1942); Norris v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 148 Kan. 122, 79 P.2d 842 (1938).

13 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d
571,577 (10th Cir. 1929).
14 Richardson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 171 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1948). But see, Schiel v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 931 (1950). See generally Gerlack, The
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jurisdictions follow this reasoning." Substantially the same rationale is employed
in allowing the insurer to litigate the question of the insured's true age, where it has
been misstated either innocently or by
fraud. 16 This action, too, is not considered
to be a contest within the meaning of the
clause as long as the sole purpose is to adjust the proceeds payable under the policy
according to the age of the insured. 17 In
like manner, the non-contest clause does
not bar a defense that the particular risk
involved is not covered by the terms of the
policy."8
If a "contest," as distinguished from the
above actions, is commenced within the
time allowed by the incontestability clause,
the insurer cannot thereafter be barred by
the operation of the clause. A contest

Incontestable Clause and Reformation, 1949 INS.

L.J. 489.
". See Grenis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
154 Misc. 867, 278 N.Y. Supp. 137 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd inein., 246 App. Div. 603, 284 N.Y. Supp.
976 (1st Dep't 1935); VANCE, op. cit. sutpra note
11, § 97, at 590; 29A AM. JuR. Insurance § 1130
(1960).
16 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway, 151
F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1945); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Veit, 294 N.Y. 222, 62 N.E.2d 45 (1945); Sipp
v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 Atd.
221 (1928). Contra, Lincoln Health & Ace. Ins.
Co. v. Jones, 175 Okla. 211, 52 P.2d 793 (1928)
(per curiam).
17 Kelly v. Prudential Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 143, 6 A.2d
55 (1939) (insurer cannot raise defense of fraud
as to misstatement of age in procuring the policy
so as to completely defeat liability).
18 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y.
449, 169 N.E. 642 (1930). "The provision that a
policy shall be incontestable after it has been in
force during the lifetime of the insured for a
period of two years is not a mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the
insurer, It means only this, that within the limits
of the coverage, the policy shall stand, unaffected
by any defense that it was invalid by reason of a
condition broken." Id. at 452, 169 N.E. at 642.

begins when the insured avoids, or seeks to
avoid, the obligation of the contract by
action or defense. If the insured or the
beneficiary is plaintiff, suing to declare the
policy in force or to recover money due,
the contest takes its start when the insurer
serves an answer disclaiming liability.'')
In deciding the instant case, the Court
stated that the basic issue is: "Are the...
incontestable clauses for the benefit of the
company-insurers, as well as for the benefit
of the insureds and the annuitants?" The
question was answered in the affirmative.
The Court relied heavily on the fact that
there was nothing in the contracts to indicate that the clause was intended for the
insured only, and that "numerous cases
contain language ... which leads to the
conclusion that incontestability clauses are
for the benefit of both the insurer and the
insured." 2 '
In one of the cases which the Court relied upon, it was said:
This clause is of vast importance and benefit, both to the insured and to the insurer. It
enables the latter to increase his business by
giving an assurance to persons doubtful of

-Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N.Y.
44, 49, 166 N.E. 798, 800 (1929); accord, American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
See Romano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271
N.Y. 288, 2 N.E.2d 661 (1936); Jansen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 336, 167 N.E. 462
(1929); Kocak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237
App. Div. 780, 263 N.Y. Supp. 283 (3d Dep't),
afi'd mere., 263 N.Y. 518, 189 N.E. 677 (1933);
Ramsay v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 297 III. 592,
131 N.E. 108 (1921).
20Newton v.New York Life Ins. Co., 210 F.
Supp. 859, 860 (N.D.Cal. 1962). The other issue
presented was, inthe inclusion of an incontestable
clause inan annuity contract for the benefit of the
issuing company since the risk of loss primarily
falls on the annuitant? This was decided in favor
of the insurance company, Id. at 861-62.
21 I. at 861. But see, Donohue v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D.Conn. 1949).

9
the utility of insurance that neither they nor
their families, after the lapse of a given
time, shall be harassed with lawsuits ...
While it is true that this case and the
other cases cited do contain language to the
effect that the incontestable clause is for
the benefit of both parties,2 3 it is clear upon
closer examination of these cases that a
different benefit was contemplated for the
insurer than the protection contended for
by the Court in the instant case. The benefit of the non-contest clause to the insurance
company will not be denied. As stated earlier, the insurance companies voluntarily
adopted the clause to eliminate understandable apprehensions on the part of the prospective policyholder and to thereby increase
their business. Yet, in spite of the fact that
the benefit expressed is purely one of sales
attraction and not one of protection beyond
rights available to the insurer absent the
clause, there is still language in several of
the cited cases that would tend to lead one
to the conclusion that the clause serves to
protect both sides."'
In discussing the benefit or protection
given by the clause, the chief recipient is
generally considered to be the policyholder..2 5 One reason advanced for this poKansas Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 123
Ky. 21, 26, 93 S.W. 609, 610 (1906); accord,
Chinery v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 Misc.
107, 182 N.Y. Supp. 555 (2d Dep't 1920).
: Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F.2d
571 (10th Cir. 1929); Dorman v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Cal.),
afi'd, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939); Winer v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 138 Fla. 818, 190 So. 894
(1939); Baum v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 357 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1960).
2, Dorman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 23, at 893. Compare Winer v. New
York Life Ins. Co., suipra note 23, with Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 130 Fla. II, 176 So. 875
(1937).
2
' 'E.g.,
Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251
22

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

1963

sition is that where there can be more than
one meaning available to a provision in an
insurance contract the one which is most
2
favorable to the insured will be adopted.. 6
A more cogent argument, however, was presented by Chief Justice Cardozo of the New
York Court of Appeals:
The value of a clause declaring a policy incontestable lies to no slight degree in the
definiteness of the protection accorded to
the holder. The good that it promises is in
part a state of mind. After a lapse of two
years the insured is no longer to be harassed
by the fear that the policy will be avoided
by interested witnesses asserting in later
days that there was a disclaimer long ago.
After a like lapse the beneficiaries are no
longer to be subjected to the risk of forfeiture though notices or warnings that may be
hard to disprove when the insured is in his
2 7

grave.

The basis-for this position becomes obvious when the purpose of the inclusion of
the incontestable clause is examined in view
of underlying public policy. Life insurance has become an institution in our complex society. It is an integral and important
factor in family planning and many estates
are built around little more than a single
policy. To reach such a high regard, the
policy must be able to create complete stability. It must therefore be absolutely free
from doubt as to the distribution of proceeds. s The incontestable clause accomplishes this and maintains the equilibrium
N.Y. 44, 166 N.E. 798 (1929); Kansas Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 123 Ky. 21, 93 S.W. 609
(1906). See Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Trust Co., 53 R.I. 334, 166 Atd. 809
(1933); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Schlink, 175 Ill. 284, 51 N.E. 795 (1898).
"-Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co.,
263 U.S. 167, 174 (1923).
•27Killian v. Metropoitan Life Ins. Co., supra note
25, at 49, 166 N.E. at 800.
"S See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. John-
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important to a proper functioning of the
community. When the income-producer
passes on, the family can, nevertheless,
maintain itself. It is with this view in sight
that courts have given the clause so broad
and encompassing a construction as to defeat any defense with respect to the validity
of the policy.
It is this overriding public policy that has
caused an anomaly in contract law. It is
firmly established that fraud is a ground for
vitiating all contracts,-' yet it is possible for
an insurer, in effect, to agree never to raise
the defense of fraud once a specified period
has elapsed. The reason for upholding this
agreement is that of the two public policies
here in play, the one condemning fraud must
succumb to that which favors the interests of the insured and beneficiary.'" Various explanations have been given for this,
some of which are: (I) The sense of security given to the great majority of honest
policyholders makes the advantage given
to the few dishonest people worthwhile;:"
(2) The clause does not condone fraud,
but on the contrary, recognizes it and gives
ample time to establish it as a defense;2
(3) The insurer has ample time and facilities to discover the fraud before the policy
is issued;,"," (4) The insurer should not be
allowed to wait until the insured is dead to
contest the contract, since the insured's in-

son, 254 U.S. 96, 101-02 (1920).
"!)5

WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

§

1487

(rev.

ed.

1937).
10Kansas Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, supra
note 22. MacKendree v. Southern States Life Ins.
Co., 112 S.C. 335, 99 S.E. 806, 807 (1919).
31Maslin v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 3 F.
Supp. 368, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
:2 Wright v.Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n of America,
118 N.Y. 237, 243, 23 N.E. 186, 187 (1890).
3 MacKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co.,
supra note 30, at 339, 99 S.E. at 807.

tent cannot easily be shown and very often
the insured's witnesses are no longer available;:" (5) The clause merely creates a
short statute of limitations in favor of the
insured.'"
It has also been said that the several incontestable statutes in New York:"; "undoubtedly enunciate a rule of public policy
requiring the incorporation of incontestability clauses favorable to policyholders.
A number of other cases construing
legislative intent have held that an incontestable clause cannot be broader than the
statute in exempting defenses from operation of the clause;"" it must be at least as
favorable to the insured and beneficiary as
required by statute. But this is not to say that
the clause cannot be more favorable to the
insured."' In Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co.
v. Wallerstein,"' the insurance company did
not disclaim coverage but instead brought
an action in tort for damages on the ground
that the insured had fraudulently induced
:14
Ibid.

:'5Ramsay v. Old Colony Life Ins. Co., 297 Ill.
592, 596, 131 N.E. 108, 109 (1921). Contra,
Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Thayer, 84 Okla. 238,
241, 203 Pac. 190, 192 (1921) (clause is not a
short statute of limitation but a constituent part of
the contract); Citizens' Life Ins. Co. v. McClure,
138 Ky. 137, 147, 127 S.W. 749, 752 (1910)
(statute of limitations applies to actions, not defenses, as does the clause).
:,N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 155(b), 163(b).
:17
Allick v. Columbian Protective Ass'n, 269 App.
Div. 281, 285, 55 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (lst Dep't),
afl'd mere., 295 N.Y. 603, 64 N.E.2d 350 (1945).
:3E.g., Foster v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 118
N.J.L. 228, 230-31, 192 Atd. 59, 61 (1937); American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Tabor, Ill Tex. 155, 160.
230 S.W. 397, 398-99 (1921).
:11'
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Conley, 55 F.2d 421
(D. Minn. 1932); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wineberg, 319 III. App. 177, 182, 49 N.E.2d 44, 47
(1943).
411
91 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 755 (1937).
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the company to issue the policy. In denying the insurance company recovery, the
Court said:
IT]he purpose of the statutory enactments
requiring the inclusion of incontestability
clauses in all policies of life insurance, is to
protect the insured and his beneficiary from
contests arising out of the policy after the
expiration of the statutory period and do
away with litigation on it.
There can be no doubt that the purpose
of enacting legislation in this area is to protect the policyholder and the beneficiary."
In his annual message to the New York
State Legislature on January 3, 1906, Governor Higgins said, "You will be called upon
to make a radical revision of the law for
the benefit of investors in life insurance and
for the regulation and restraint of the com,,
panies. "'2
Then in April, 1906, the Governor remarked on his recommendations
and the proposed draft which was eventually enacted, that the purpose of the proposed legislation was " 'to restore public
confidence and to compel life insurance
companies to conduct a safe, honest and
open business for the benefit of their policy
holders.' -"4This is the atmosphere in which
our first incontestable statute"" was drawn.
It seems that if the 'rule of the instant
45
case, Newton v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
were to be adopted, barring the insured as
well as the insurer from asserting inception
defenses after the contestable period has
41S. REi-. No. 1128, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 10
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run, the balance of power in favor of the insurer which the legislature has attempted
to eliminate, will once again become firmly
entrenched in our insurance law. The problem is real. It is not too difficult to imagine
a concerned husband and father purchasing
insurance, upon the representations of the
insurer, to provide for his family. After the
contestable period has elapsed it is learned
that the representations were false. What
remedies arc available to the policyholder
besides abandoning the policy and relinquishing all coverage under it? Since the
issue of misrepresentation can no longer be
raised, neither rescission nor an action in
tort for damages would be available. 46 Reformation of the policy would most likely be
denied since in the above hypothetical the
element of mistake is absent. Further, the
insured might not be able to obtain new
insurance because of the increase in his age;
if he is eligible for a new policy the rates
will be higher than they would have been
at the time the former policy was purchased.
A consideration not to be overlooked is,
to what extent would general judicial acceptance of the Newton rule vary insurance
company practice? It has been held that misrepresenting the benefits of a policy, as
prohibited by statute in New York, 47 is a
misdemeanor."" In addition, the insurer is
liable to a penalty which may be recovered
by the injured party.4 9 By strict application
of the Newton rule, this statutory cause of

(1930).

'-Governor Higgins' Annual Message to the Legislature of the State of New York, January 3,

1906, in 10

MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS

840

(Lincoln ed. 1906).
43Memorandum of Governor Higgins filed with
Senate Bill, Chapter 326, April 27, 1906, in 10
MESSAGES

FROM THE GOVENORS

906 (Lincoln

ed. 1906).
4,,
Laws of New York, 1906, ch. 326, § 101.
4.,
210 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Cal. 1962).

4Cf. Wright v. Mutual Benefit Life Ass'n

of
America, 118 N.Y. 237, 23 N.E. 186 (1890);
Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein,
91 F.2d 351, 353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 755 (1937).
'7N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 127, 211.
-is People v. Legg, 234 App. Div. 372, 255 N.Y.
Supp. 188 (1st Dep't). afl'd meri., 259 N.Y. 654.
182 N.E. 221 (1932).
49 N.Y. INS. LAW § 211(4).
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action may no longer be available. This, in
addition to the fact that the insured would
have no other remedy against the company,
might encourage fraudulent practices by
some insurers. The incontestable clause was
given the wide scope it has today largely
because of a public policy favoring protection of the policyholder and his beneficiary.
This public policy argument, which is in
reality the only basis for the very unusual
denial of the defense of fraud, cannot logically be applied to the insurer. To so interpret the clause defeats the very purpose for
its favorable judicial treatment by weakening the overall position of the policyholder

with respect to the company. No special
interests of the insurance companies need
this extra protection. But even if some interest of the insurer does exist that is deserving of a special consideration, it still remains
that the insured does not have equal facilities and opportunities to uncover the unscrupulous acts of the other party. It is
hoped that courts subsequently deciding the
issue presented in Newton will consider the
conflicting interests involved in view of potential detriment to beneficiaries of insureds
and consequent ill effects upon the public
likely to stem from judicial ratification of
the instant case.

